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Financial Reform: Making the 
System Safer and Fairer
Michael S.  Barr
2014 conference on financial reform organized 
by the University of Michigan’s Center on Fi-
nance, Law and Policy, sponsored by the Rus-
sell Sage Foundation.1
The RooTs of The financial cRisis
The financial crisis was not an act of nature, 
or a fluke of history. Rather, the crisis was 
rooted in years of unconstrained excess and 
failures of risk management on Wall Street, 
and prolonged complacency in Washington 
and in major financial capitals around the 
world. That complacency was based on a mis-
placed ideology: that private markets would 
take care of risk regulation on their own. And 
it was based on a misunderstanding: that 
somehow, since the risk of bank runs had been 
conquered, there was no risk to “shadow bank-
ing.” Market discipline, it was believed, would 
force firms to engage in sound risk manage-
ment. Market-based financing, it was thought, 
would protect taxpayers, since no federally in-
sured deposits were at risk. But both the ideol-
ogy and the understanding were deeply flawed. 
The costs of failure—regardless of the nature 
of financial intermediation or the corporate 
structure of the financial firm—were borne 
In the fall of 2008, the financial crisis crushed 
the U.S. economy and plunged the country into 
the Great Recession. The crisis shuttered 
American businesses, cost millions of Ameri-
cans their jobs, and wiped out home values 
and household savings. The macro effects hit 
hardest and were the longest lasting for those 
least able to bear the brunt of the crisis. It was 
devastating to middle-income families and 
perhaps even more so to low- and moderate-
income households, who had little financial 
buffer (Barr 2012a). Financial stability, never 
robust for these families, dropped precipi-
tously (Barr and Schaffa 2016). Both in the 
United States and globally, the crisis has led to 
a series of fundamental reforms. (For an early 
analysis, see Barr 2012b). At the same time, 
more needs to be done to make the financial 
system safer, fairer, and better harnessed to the 
needs of the real economy. This essay first de-
scribes the origins of the financial crisis and 
then outlines domestic reforms. It then turns 
to the need for global coordination in financial 
reform, and analyzes steps taken thus far, 
while highlighting some of the key remaining 
challenges ahead. Finally, it introduces other 
articles in this volume, produced as part of a 
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throughout society, and not fully internalized 
to the firms’ managers, shareholders, and 
creditors. Indeed, government intervention to 
prevent even more brutal damage to the econ-
omy had the effect of helping to insulate the 
firms’ stakeholders from full harm.
The financial sector engaged in highly lever-
aged, short-funded maturity transformation 
with too little transparency, not enough capi-
tal, and little restraint. Large firms became 
more interconnected. Investment banks and 
other financial conglomerates relied increas-
ingly on short-term funding from money mar-
ket funds, securities lenders, and securities 
lenders’ prime brokerage business. This short-
term funding was subject to runs during peri-
ods of market uncertainty, just like bank de-
posits before the age of deposit insurance and 
a lender of last resort in the form of the Federal 
Reserve (see, for example, Gorton and Metrick 
2012). Huge amounts of risk moved outside the 
more regulated parts of the banking system to 
the unregulated markets, where it was easier 
to increase leverage. Legal loopholes and regu-
latory gaps allowed firms to evade oversight. 
Investment banks such as Lehman Brothers, 
insurance conglomerates such as AIG, and 
other entities performing the same market 
functions as banks escaped meaningful regula-
tion because of their corporate form. Banks 
themselves moved activities off the balance 
sheet—for example, to special-purpose vehi-
cles holding mortgage-backed securities, and 
outside the reach of more stringent regulation 
and capital rules.
Shadow banking markets were opaque and 
hid growing risk. Derivatives were traded in the 
shadows with insufficient capital to back the 
trades. Repo markets —short-term wholesale 
funding used by broker-dealers and banks—
became riskier as they grew to be a larger por-
tion of financial intermediation, and collateral 
shifted from treasuries to poorer-quality asset-
backed securities. The lack of transparency in 
securitization hid the growing wedge in incen-
tives facing different players in the system, and 
the system failed to require sufficient respon-
sibility from those who made loans, or pack-
aged them into complex instruments to be 
sold to investors. Synthetic products—essen-
tially offsetting derivatives bets—multiplied 
risks in the securitization system and allowed 
the market to increase its exposure to mort-
gage-backed securities.
The financial sector, under the guise of in-
novation, piled ill-considered risk upon risk. 
Rapid growth in key markets hid misaligned 
incentives and underlying risk. Managers 
failed to understand new risks, or when they 
did, they took steps that made the system as a 
whole worse off. Financial institutions held in-
creasingly inadequate capital against growing 
risks, and regulators failed to stop them. Man-
agers, traders, firms, credit-rating agencies, 
and other gatekeepers all let short-term re-
wards from new financial products and rapidly 
growing markets blind them to the risks.
Congress and regulators weakened con-
sumer and investor protections in the name 
of the free market. Households took on risk 
that they often did not fully understand and 
could ill afford. Investors bought implausibly 
labeled AAA securities. Mortgage fraud, secu-
rities fraud, fraudulent manipulation of key 
indices and currency markets—all harmed 
individuals and institutional investors and 
undermined the integrity of the market as a 
whole. Rising home prices helped to feed the 
financial system’s rapid growth and to hide 
the declining underwriting standards for the 
origination and securitization of mortgage 
loans.
When home prices began to flatten, and 
then to decline, fault lines were revealed. Mort-
gage defaults soared and the assets based 
on mortgages plunged in value. The asset im-
plosion in housing led to cascades throughout 
the financial system. Nonbank mortgage lend-
ers collapsed. Investment banks could no lon-
ger borrow. Fire sales of assets, collateral calls 
on derivative contracts, and the tightening or 
closing off of repo and commercial paper mar-
kets drove firms closer to the edge. Contagion 
gripped the financial system, as the problems 
at weaker firms undermined stronger ones. 
Failures in the shadow banking system led to 
failures in more regulated parts of the banking 
system. Then, in the fall of 2008, credit mar-
kets froze. The overreliance on short-term fi-
nancing and excessive risk taking that had pro-
duced significant profit in financial capitals in 
the developed economies across the world 
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fanned a panic that nearly collapsed the global 
financial system.
oveRview of RefoRms
In the United States, passage of the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Pro-
tection Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank”) ushered in 
comprehensive reform in key areas: enlarging 
the regulatory perimeter by creating the au-
thority to regulate financial firms that pose a 
threat to financial stability, without regard to 
their corporate form; enacting a resolution au-
thority to deal with the potential collapse of 
these major firms in the event of a crisis, with-
out feeding a panic or putting taxpayers on the 
hook; attacking regulatory arbitrage, restrict-
ing risky activities, and beefing up banking su-
pervision; requiring central clearing and ex-
change trading of standardized derivatives, 
and capital, margin and transparency through-
out the market; improving investor protec-
tions; and establishing a new Consumer Finan-
cial Protection Bureau to look out for the 
interests of American households.
Today, major financial firms are subject to 
higher prudential standards, including higher 
capital and liquidity requirements, stress tests, 
and resolution planning through “living wills.” 
By forcing firms to internalize more of the costs 
that they impose on the system, they will be 
incentivized to shrink and reduce their com-
plexity, leverage, and interconnections. Should 
such a firm fail, there will be a bigger capital 
buffer to absorb losses. To stem a panic, the 
Dodd-Frank Act permits the Federal Deposit In-
surance Corporation (FDIC) to resolve the larg-
est and most interconnected financial compa-
nies without exposing the system to a sudden, 
disorderly failure that puts the economy at risk.
On the global level, the international com-
munity has put forward new rules on capital, 
so that there are bigger buffers in the system 
in the event of failures. Capital will be mea-
sured in a more conservative way, and capital 
levels are going up significantly. Systemically 
important firms will hold even higher levels of 
capital. There are new rules on liquidity and a 
global leverage limit. Derivatives reforms are 
proceeding, as are new approaches to dealing 
with the risks from repo and securities financ-
ing transactions.
Yet much more work remains to be done, 
and the financial sector did not leave the bat-
tlefield after their defeats in 2010. Far from it. 
The brutal fight over financial reform rages on, 
and there is serious risk that a collective am-
nesia about the causes and consequences of 
the financial crisis appears to be descending 
on global financial capitals that will further 
weaken the resolve for reform (See, for exam-
ple, Coffee 2011, 2012).
compaRing U.s.  financial 
RegUl aTion pRe-  cRisis and  
posT-  RefoRm
Many readers may be skeptical regarding the 
efficacy of the reforms that have taken place 
thus far, either because they think they did not 
change the system enough, or because they 
think that they went too far. The following sec-
tion takes the time to chart the path of reform 
so far, before turning to the difficulties and 
dangers on the road ahead.
First, before Dodd- Frank, if an entity was a 
bank, it had tougher regulations, more strin-
gent capital requirements, and more robust 
supervision; but if an entity was an investment 
bank engaged in the same kind of maturity 
transformation, it had to abide by different 
rules (see Scott 2010). When U.S. investment 
banks needed to find a “consolidated holding 
company regulator” in order to meet European 
Union standards for doing business in Europe, 
the Securities and Exchange Commission set 
up a voluntary Consolidated Supervised Entity 
program which had little oversight. The SEC 
was not established as a prudential regulator, 
did not have clear supervisory power, and had 
little experience and few trained examiners. 
Moreover, the leverage ratio that served as a 
backstop for bank capital requirements was 
not applied to investment banks.
The Federal Reserve was too lax in supervis-
ing firms where it did have authority and it did 
not have any authority to set and enforce cap-
ital requirements on the major institutions 
that operated businesses outside of bank hold-
ing companies. That meant it had no supervi-
sion over investment banks, diversified finan-
cial institutions such as AIG, or the nonbank 
financial companies competing with banks in 
the mortgage, consumer credit, and business 
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lending markets. The Office of Thrift Supervi-
sion viewed its role as supervising thrifts, not 
their holding companies (such as AIG). Banks 
and thrifts freely engaged in risky mortgage 
lending, and regulators did not step in until it 
was too late.
Today, Dodd- Frank has provided authority 
for clear, strong and consolidated supervision 
and regulation by the Federal Reserve of any 
financial firm—regardless of legal form—
whose failure could pose a threat to financial 
stability. The largest investment banks that 
survived the financial crisis merged into or be-
came bank holding companies subject to Fed 
oversight. AIG, GE Capital, Prudential, and 
MetLife have now been brought under Fed su-
pervision through the Financial Stability Over-
sight Council (FSOC) designation. As a result 
of Dodd- Frank changes, thrift holding compa-
nies (including those with large insurance op-
erations) are now supervised by the Fed. The 
Office of Thrift Supervision and the SEC’s in-
vestment bank regime have been abolished. 
Thus, all bank and thrift holding companies, 
as well as systemically important nonbank 
firms, regardless of corporate form, are super-
vised by the Federal Reserve. We will have a 
single point of accountability for tougher and 
more consistent supervision of the largest and 
most interconnected financial firms.
Although the regulatory infrastructure is, to 
put it mildly, far from ideal, with too many di-
vided responsibilities and too many opportu-
nities for turf battles or regulatory gaps, Dodd- 
Frank created the FSOC, which is responsible 
for identifying threats to financial stability and 
dealing with them. The FSOC can recommend 
stricter regulatory action, and regulators must 
either implement such changes or explain pub-
licly why they are not acting (see Gerson 2013). 
Already, this process has led the SEC to impose 
stricter regulation of money market funds than 
would otherwise have occurred (Barr 2015a). 
The FSOC has the potential to get information 
across the financial services marketplace 
through the Office of Financial Research (OFR), 
which Dodd- Frank established and empow-
ered to collect data from any financial firm, 
and to develop and enforce standardization for 
data collection. The OFR has begun to use this 
authority by developing a “legal entity identi-
fier” for financial transactions. The OFR is 
charged with independently assessing risks in 
the financial system, and can potentially serve 
as a counterweight to the Fed by providing in-
dependent assessments of whether the Fed is 
adequately supervising the largest firms and 
dealing with the critical issues in systemic risk. 
A strong OFR can serve as a check and balance 
for regulatory agencies, ensuring that they im-
prove their own performance or risk being crit-
icized (Ludwig 2012; Barr 2015a).
Dodd- Frank provides for more stringent 
prudential standards and higher capital and 
liquidity standards for the largest bank and 
nonbank firms. In addition to the heightened 
capital requirements applicable to all firms, 
the largest firms are subject to a capital sur-
charge, a leverage ratio, a toughened supple-
mental leverage ratio, a more stringent liquid-
ity requirement, and capital required to pass 
stress tests.
Already, capital levels in the banking system 
have doubled, and banks’ use of short- term 
nondeposit funding has plummeted. The an-
nual stress tests are evaluating a firm’s ability 
to withstand deep market contractions. There 
are enhanced rules on affiliate transactions 
and lending limits, and much stricter pro-
posed limits on counterparty credit exposures. 
Deposit insurance premiums are going up on 
the very largest firms. The Volcker Rule prohib-
its banking entities from engaging in certain 
proprietary trading or running internal hedge 
funds, subject to a number of exceptions, and 
also helps to simplify the task of winding down 
major firms that are at risk of failure. More-
over, the Fed is using macro- prudential super-
vision as it increases its capacity to understand 
and mitigate risks to the financial system as a 
whole.
There is a healthy debate about breaking up 
or limiting the size of financial firms. Under 
the Dodd- Frank Act, major firms are subject to 
a concentration limit that generally prohibits 
a financial company from engaging in mergers 
or acquisitions that would result in the firm’s 
liabilities—including wholesale funding and 
off- balance sheet exposures—exceeding 10 per-
cent of the liabilities of financial companies as 
a whole. Dodd- Frank provides regulators with 
the authority to require financial institutions 
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to restructure their activities to make it credi-
ble that they can be resolved if they are in dan-
ger of collapse; the resolution planning pro-
cess has already forced firms to begin to 
simplify their organization form, develop 
“clean” holding companies, and place large 
amounts of capital and long- term debt in the 
holding company to assist with the resolution. 
The act also permits regulators to force firms 
to be broken up if they fail to submit a credible 
plan and thereafter fail to meet regulators’ re-
quirements to restructure themselves to make 
resolution credible. Such firms can also be bro-
ken up if they are found to pose a grave threat 
to financial stability. These enhanced pruden-
tial measures for major financial firms are 
likely to reduce risk in the financial system, 
constrain further concentration, and reduce 
“too big to fail” distortions.
Second, before Dodd- Frank, shadow bank-
ing markets grew dramatically with little over-
sight and in the absence of even regulatory or 
marketwide knowledge about the nature of the 
markets they were serving. For example, the 
OTC derivatives market—with a notional 
amount of $700 trillion at its peak—grew up in 
the shadows, with little oversight. Credit de-
rivatives, which were supposed to diffuse risk, 
instead concentrated it. Synthetic securitiza-
tion with embedded derivatives magnified fail-
ures in the real securitization market. Major 
financial firms used derivatives to increase 
their credit exposure to each other, rather than 
decrease it.
We should never again face a situation—
such as AIG’s $2 trillion derivatives portfolio—
where the potential failure of a virtually un-
regulated, capital- deficient major player in the 
derivatives market can impose devastating 
risks on the entire system. Insufficient capital 
meant that major participants in the system 
could not reliably pay out on their obligations, 
and insufficient margin meant that counter-
parties on every transaction were more ex-
posed to the risk of nonpayment. When the 
crisis began, regulators, financial firms, and 
investors had an insufficient understanding of 
the degree to which trouble at one firm spelled 
trouble for another, because of the opacity of 
the market. This lack of information magnified 
the contagion as the crisis intensified, causing 
a damaging wave of margin increases, delever-
aging, and credit market breakdowns. Lack of 
transparency, insufficient supervision, and in-
adequate capital and margin left our financial 
system vulnerable to concentrations of risk, 
and to abuse. 
Today, under Dodd- Frank, regulators are 
putting in place the tools comprehensively to 
regulate the OTC derivatives market for the 
first time. The act requires all standardized de-
rivatives to be centrally cleared, which will sub-
stantially reduce the buildup of bilateral coun-
terparty credit risk between major financial 
firms. Under Dodd- Frank rules, 75 percent of 
new derivative contracts were centrally cleared 
in 2015 as compared to only 15 percent in 2007 
(Massad 2015). Central clearinghouses are sub-
ject to strong prudential supervision under the 
Dodd- Frank Act. Dodd- Frank requires stan-
dardized derivatives to be traded on exchanges 
or alternative swap execution facilities, which 
improves pre- and post- trade price transpar-
ency. Trading transparency will help to im-
prove price competition as well as to improve 
safety and soundness, as market participants 
and regulators will have full access to current 
prices in the event of system disruptions. Even 
non- centrally- cleared OTC derivatives are to be 
reported to a trade repository, making the mar-
ket far more transparent.
The act provides for prudential regulation, 
capital requirements, and business conduct 
rules for all swap dealers and major swap par-
ticipants. It provides for robust capital and 
margin requirements for derivative transac-
tions, and higher requirements for those that 
are not centrally cleared, providing a strong in-
centive to use central clearing and maintain a 
bigger buffer against losses. It also provides for 
regulatory and enforcement tools to go after 
manipulation, fraud, and other abuse.
At the same time as the act reforms deriva-
tives markets, it provides a new framework for 
regulation of financial market utilities and crit-
ical payment, clearing, and settlement activi-
ties, including not only those in the derivatives 
markets but also those in the wholesale fund-
ing markets—securities financing transactions 
(such as repo and securities lending), commer-
cial paper, and prime brokerage—that are crit-
ical to the shadow banking system.
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In the lead- up to the financial crisis, major 
financial firms became increasingly funded not 
by traditional bank deposits, nor even longer- 
term funding in the commercial markets, but 
rather by overnight funding in the repo mar-
kets. An important part of that market, the tri-
party repo market, became increasingly con-
centrated in only two major clearing banks, 
which were themselves exposed to counter-
party risk from securities firms borrowing in-
traday credit. As the triparty repo market be-
came more concentrated, it also became riskier 
because counterparties came to accept not 
only Treasury securities as collateral, but also 
highly rated but opaque asset- backed securi-
ties. These securities in turn became riskier as 
credit rating agencies became increasingly 
willing to label as safe assets that were lower 
quality, including pools of securities backed 
only by poorly underwritten subprime and Alt-
 A mortgages. When the financial crisis hit, 
repo and commercial paper markets froze, and 
investors in money market funds ran, causing 
a massive contraction in credit not only for fi-
nancial firms but also major firms in the real 
economy (that is, non- financial). This contrac-
tion was overcome only with massive interven-
tions by the Fed, the FDIC, and the Treasury.
The Dodd- Frank Act provides the founda-
tion fundamentally to reform the wholesale 
funding markets by providing strong authority 
for the Federal Reserve to regulate financial 
market utilities and critical payment, clearing, 
and settlement activities; to set new rules for 
capital, collateral, and margin requirements 
for repo and other securities financing, and 
other critical markets; and to establish uni-
form prudential standards throughout the fi-
nancial system. While repo and other securi-
ties financing policies are still a work in 
progress, short- term financing reforms are al-
ready being reinforced by new capital and li-
quidity requirements, liability concentration 
limits under the act, and reforms to the assess-
ment base for deposit insurance that encom-
pass all liabilities. Once fully implemented, 
these reforms will have the combined effect of 
taxing short- term liabilities, which will force 
firms to internalize more of the costs of short- 
term funding. These steps have already re-
duced the use of short- term funding, and will 
provide incentives to manage their use more 
carefully even when interest rates normalize.
The act also fundamentally transforms reg-
ulation of another major element of the 
shadow banking system, securitization. The 
act requires deep transparency into the struc-
ture of securitizations, including information 
about assets and originators. Securitization 
sponsors must generally retain risk in their se-
curitizations, unless the mortgages they pool 
meet guidelines as plain vanilla “qualified res-
idential mortgages” so that incentives are bet-
ter aligned among participants in the system. 
Capital rules will better account for risk in se-
curitizations. Parallel changes in accounting 
rules will now bring the most common forms 
of securitization onto the balance sheet. 
Credit- rating agencies will be subject to height-
ened liability for failure to conduct ratings 
with integrity, with comprehensive oversight 
by the SEC, including policing of ratings shop-
ping and conflicts of interest; ratings them-
selves will be more transparent and will in-
clude key information on rating methodology, 
compliance, qualitative and quantitative data, 
due diligence, and other protections.
Third, before Dodd- Frank, consumer pro-
tection regulation was fragmented over seven 
federal regulators, and prudential regulators 
often viewed consumer protection with hostil-
ity. Regulators lacked mission focus, market- 
wide coverage, and consolidated authority. 
Nonbanks could avoid federal supervision. 
Banks could choose the least restrictive con-
sumer approach among several different bank-
ing agencies. Federal regulators pre- empted 
state consumer protections laws without ade-
quately replacing these important safeguards. 
Fragmentation of rule writing, supervision and 
enforcement led to finger pointing in place of 
effective action.
Today, despite repeated congressional ef-
forts to block its director, stymie its funding, 
overturn its structure and undermine its au-
thority, the Consumer Financial Protection Bu-
reau (CFPB) has been built into a strong orga-
nization. It has marketwide coverage and is 
setting new rules of the road for banks and 
nonbanks alike to police against abuses. It has 
strong supervisory authority over banks with 
at least $10 billion in assets and over broad 
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parts of the nonbank markets. It is basing its 
work on an empirically grounded understand-
ing of human behavior (see Barr, Mullaina-
than, and Shafir 2009), rather than abstract 
models and ideological assumptions. And it is 
already helping to end misleading sales pitches 
and hidden traps. Rather, it is making space 
for banks and nonbanks to compete vigorously 
for consumers on the basis of price and qual-
ity. It is strongly independent—with secure 
funding, policy, regulatory and enforcement 
authority—and strongly accountable, with reg-
ular reporting to the Congress and the public 
(see Barr 2015a).
The CFPB has already made significant 
progress in making financial services markets 
work better. For example, implementation of 
rules under the Credit Card Act of 2009 is sav-
ing consumers nearly $12 billion annually in 
reduced credit card fees, without increasing 
interest rates or undermining access (Agarwal 
et al. 2015). Reforms of the mortgage market 
are helping to eliminate some of the worst 
abuses such as steering low- income and mi-
nority borrowers to high- cost loans; mortgage 
disclosures are now both simpler and more in-
formative; and mortgage servicing is being 
strongly policed. The CFPB is tackling a broad 
range of other critical issues, including auto, 
student, and payday loans; credit reporting 
and debt collection; and protection of military 
service members and their families. CFPB en-
forcement actions had resulted in more than 
$11 billion in relief to 25 million consumers as 
of 2015 (Cordray 2015). Key upcoming decisions 
include whether and how the CFPB should reg-
ulate or prohibit mandatory predispute arbi-
tration agreements (Barr 2015b).
Fourth, before Dodd- Frank, the government 
did not have the authority to unwind large, 
highly leveraged, and substantially intercon-
nected financial firms that failed—such as 
Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and AIG—
without disrupting the broader financial sys-
tem. Firms benefitted from the perception that 
they were “too- big- to- fail,” which reduced mar-
ket discipline and encouraged excessive risk 
taking by firms. It provided an artificial incen-
tive for large firms to grow and tipped the play-
ing field in favor of the largest firms. When the 
financial crisis hit, the inability to resolve 
these firms left the government with the un-
tenable choice between taxpayer- funded bail-
outs, as with AIG, or the disorderly financial 
collapse of a major firm, as with Lehman 
Brothers, the failure of which contributed to 
widespread financial cascades and contagion 
that threatened to bring down the financial 
system, and harmed the real economy.
 Today, major bank and nonbank financial 
firms are subject to heightened prudential 
standards, including higher capital and liquid-
ity requirements, stress tests, and “living 
wills.” The living wills process is forcing firms 
to simplify their organizational forms, develop 
“clean” holding companies that can be re-
solved without disrupting their subsidiaries’ 
functions. Firms are being required to hold suf-
ficient capital and long- term debt at the hold-
ing company level to permit resolution. Global 
derivatives contracts are being rewritten to per-
mit resolution without triggering cross- 
defaults and the seizure of collateral. Firms 
will be forced by these standards to internalize 
more of the costs that they might impose on 
the system, which will give them incentives to 
shrink and reduce their complexity, leverage, 
and interconnections. Should such a firm fail, 
there will be a bigger capital buffer to absorb 
losses. These measures will, over time, help to 
reduce risks in and among the largest financial 
institutions. In the event that such an institu-
tion fails, these actions will minimize the risk 
that a firm’s failure will pose a danger to the 
stability of the financial system. But that is not 
enough. The government also needs the tools 
to respond in a crisis, to prevent financial col-
lapse, and to protect taxpayers.
That is why Dodd- Frank permits the FDIC 
to resolve the largest and most interconnected 
financial companies, consistent with the ap-
proach long taken for bank failures. Under the 
Orderly Liquidation Authority, the FDIC now 
has the capacity to deal with the potential fail-
ure of a major financial conglomerate in an 
orderly fashion that limits collateral damage 
to the system. Shareholders and other provid-
ers of regulatory capital and long- term convert-
ible debt to the firm will be forced to absorb 
any losses.
The FDIC has made significant progress in 
developing a strategy under the Dodd- Frank 
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authorities, known as the “single point of en-
try,” which would permit the holding company 
of a financial conglomerate to be resolved 
without necessarily disrupting the ability of its 
operating subsidiaries—bank, broker- dealer, 
or other parts—to function. Firms are required 
to hold sufficient long- term debt at the holding- 
company level to facilitate an orderly winding 
down of the holding company while permit-
ting operating subsidiaries of the firm to con-
tinue to operate. Management can be termi-
nated and the compensation of culpable 
managers can be clawed back. Critical assets 
and liabilities of the firm can be transferred to 
a bridge institution so that the firm can be re-
solved without causing cascading collapses in 
the financial system. In the event that the 
firm’s internal capital and long- term debt are 
insufficient to support restructuring and ongo-
ing operations, liquidity can be obtained 
through Treasury borrowing that is automati-
cally repaid from the sale of assets of the failed 
firm or, if necessary, from a preauthorized, 
ex post assessment on the largest financial 
firms—not by taxpayers. In this manner, the 
resolution authority allows the government to 
resolve the financial conglomerate without ex-
posing the system to a sudden disorderly fail-
ure that puts the whole financial sector at risk.
We need to have deep humility, however, 
about the ability to predict or manage the fail-
ure of a major financial firm, and even more 
so about the ability to deal with the failure of 
multiple firms during a financial crisis. More-
over, the creation of a domestic resolution au-
thority and the broad range of domestic re-
forms just discussed are not enough to deal 
with global financial risks. 
global RefoRms: oveRview
Global reforms undertaken to date have made 
the financial system safer, but there remain 
real questions about whether the financial sys-
tem is safe enough. Much of the reform agenda 
is still a work in progress, from capital stan-
dards to regulation of derivatives and shadow 
banking markets, to the mechanisms neces-
sary to wind down cross- border firms that get 
into financial distress. In the wake of the finan-
cial crisis, the leading economies produced a 
new set of institutions and institutional rela-
tionships that were more formal and more hi-
erarchical and were designed to improve pros-
pects for coordination. Although significant 
tensions still exist within this new system—
particularly concerning national variation 
(that is, the tailoring of global standards to in-
dividual domestic landscape), extraterritorial 
application of national rules, and the desire 
for uniform global standards—the substantive 
outcomes to date, while imperfect, messy, and 
contentious, evidence a stronger commitment 
to meaningful, long- lasting reforms than had 
been in place before the financial crisis.
There is still much more substantive work 
to do—on capital and liquidity, resolution, and 
derivatives, to name a few core areas in need 
of action. In fact, such an approach is essential 
if we are to reduce the chances of another dev-
astating global financial crisis.
Global Capital Rules
Almost immediately in the wake of the crisis, 
the G- 20 countries began to examine the pre- 
crisis weaknesses in the global bank capital 
rules. Basel II.5, which targeted risks from off- 
balance- sheet assets and market risks, was de-
veloped early in 2009 and was quickly adopted 
by the major economies. By the G- 20 summit 
in Pittsburgh in September 2009, U.S. Treasury 
Secretary Timothy Geithner had assembled a 
consensus in favor of higher capital standards. 
By late 2010, the bank regulatory standard- 
setting body known as the Basel Committee 
promulgated its “Basel III” capital standards, 
significantly revising the frameworks from 
“Basel I” and “Basel II” that had been in place 
prior to the crisis. Basel IV reforms are being 
implemented gradually across all Basel Com-
mittee member jurisdictions with full imple-
mentation set for January 1, 2019.
Basel III requires financial institutions to 
hold much- higher- quality capital for trading 
positions, securitization, and counterparty 
credit exposures in derivatives and secured 
lending transactions than its predecessor. The 
new capital requirements focus on common 
equity, significantly limiting other forms of 
funding that did not act as a buffer to absorb 
losses in a crisis. The revised rules require 
banks to hold Tier 1 capital in an amount no 
less than 6 percent of risk- weighted assets. Ba-
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sel III also introduces a new Common Equity 
Tier 1 requirement, under which banks must 
hold at least 4.5 percent of risk- weighted assets 
in common equity. Basel III also reduces the 
ability of banks to rely on riskier, less- absorbent 
forms of regulatory capital and bars banks 
from including lower- quality instruments in 
regulatory capital. Basel III requires all firms 
to hold a countercyclical “capital conservation 
buffer,” with dividends, share buybacks, or bo-
nuses limited if Common Equity Tier I levels 
are within two and a half percentage points of 
the minimum 4.5 percent Common Equity Tier 
1 level.
Basel III for the first time also imposes a 
global non- risk- based supplemental leverage 
ratio that includes firms’ off- balance- sheet 
commitments and exposures. The leverage ra-
tio requires banks to hold Tier 1 capital equal 
to 3 percent of their total exposures and is in-
tended to supplement Basel’s risk- weighted 
rules. Finally, firms posing the greatest risk to 
the financial system are required to hold even 
higher levels of capital—a surcharge” for sys-
temically important financial institutions (SI-
FIs). All global systemically important banks 
(G- SIBs) will bear this surcharge, with the most 
systemically risky G- SIBs required to hold 
more capital than those with less systemic im-
portance.
Under Basel III, minimum capital ratios are 
set at a level that represents a significant in-
crease over prior rules. There are new require-
ments that include the creation of a capital 
conservation buffer above the minimums, 
which if breached will restrict firms’ ability to 
pay dividends or buy back stock. The Basel 
Committee has put forward a graduated, risk- 
based, capital surcharge for the largest, most 
interconnected financial firms. The global 
rules also include new contingent capital in-
struments that facilitate “bail- ins”—in which 
privately issued debt transforms into equity 
under specified circumstances—to further re-
inforce that firms must internalize the costs of 
their own failure and to facilitate the resolu-
tion of globally systemically important firms. 
Furthermore, Basel III is instituting explicit 
quantitative liquidity requirements for the first 
time, to ensure that financial firms are better 
prepared for liquidity strains.
But even as some jurisdictions rightly adopt 
more stringent capital rules than those re-
quired under the Basel III approach, more 
work is needed to strengthen the global capital 
framework, at least for the largest firms. Risk- 
based capital requirements need to be made 
more transparent and comparable on a cross- 
border and institution- by- institution basis, 
and better substitutes need to be developed for 
both the discredited credit- rating agencies and 
the internal models of the regulated institu-
tions. Additionally, both the global leverage ra-
tio and the SIFI surcharge are simply too low 
for either to serve as an effective buffer against 
asset implosions or liquidity runs or to weigh 
effectively against any subsidies to “too big to 
fail” institutions. Moreover, as the countercy-
clical capital buffer is left to national economic 
circumstances and discretion, national regula-
tors should commit to economic triggers that 
would increase capital requirements and use 
other methods to reduce leverage under spec-
ified circumstances. Furthermore, stress test-
ing, which has served a critical role in bolster-
ing capital oversight in the United States, is in 
need of further refinement, more transpar-
ency, and greater predictability.
Derivatives and Wholesale  
Funding Markets
G- 20 leaders at the 2009 Pittsburgh summit 
also committed themselves to significant re-
forms in the OTC derivatives market. They 
agreed that standardized OTC derivatives 
should be moved onto exchange- trading plat-
forms and should be centrally cleared. The 
leaders also decided that all OTC derivative 
trades—including those that remained purely 
bilateral—should be reported to trade reposi-
tories. In 2011, the G- 20 further agreed that 
non- cleared- derivative contracts should be 
subject to higher margin requirements. In key 
jurisdictions, the statutory regimes for central 
clearing, exchange- based trading, and trade re-
porting are now in place, with the frameworks 
for margin requirements lagging behind. Reg-
ulatory implementation has lagged signifi-
cantly behind legislation, and persistent tech-
nical, liability, and jurisdictional problems 
with trade reporting and trade repositories 
have obstructed regulators and market partic-
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ipants from attaining a comprehensive infor-
mational view of global derivatives markets.
Furthermore, global rules for repo and 
other short- term funding markets remain na-
scent, with most jurisdictions only in the earli-
est phases of proposing rules. More regulatory 
attention is needed on the issue of hot money, 
which continues to pose significant risks to 
systemic stability, to address weaknesses in 
foreign currency markets, and to restore trust 
and confidence to benchmark global rates 
such as LIBOR (London Interbank Offered 
Rate). In sum, much of the plumbing of the 
financial system is still in need of reform (see 
Duffie 2013).
Structural Reform and Resolution
Globally, much work remains to be done in the 
area of structural reform and resolution. The 
United States and the United Kingdom have 
both embraced the need for ring fencing and 
stronger horizontal buffers between retail de-
posit banks and other, riskier, financial func-
tions, while the European Union has not ad-
opted its expert commission’s suggestions in 
that regard. In the Volcker Rule, the United 
States has adopted the strongest version of 
these reforms, but significant work still re-
mains to be done on implementation in all 
three jurisdictions. It is particularly important, 
too, that ring fencing not be viewed as a pana-
cea; structural reform will only prove effective 
to the extent it is integrated with broader 
changes in supervision, capital, and resolution 
mechanisms (See Barr and Vickers 2013).
Progress on structural reform is also impor-
tant because of the linkages between clearer 
structures for financial conglomerates and 
ease of resolution. “Living will” requirements, 
such as those adopted in the United States, can 
help ease the process of cross- border resolu-
tion by clarifying lines of authority and align-
ing business risk with organizational form, but 
these approaches are contingent on regulators’ 
willingness to execute along the lines of the 
directives of the will when most needed (see, 
for example, Levitin 2011). The United States 
and the United Kingdom have put in place a 
memorandum of understanding to facilitate 
cross- border resolution, and the single- point- 
of- entry approach, under which a financial 
conglomerate’s top- tier holding company is 
placed in resolution while its operating subsid-
iaries may continue to function, may make it 
possible to resolve such firms even in the ab-
sence of a formal cross- border mechanism for 
the resolution of highly complex firms. Only 
time will tell.
The United States’ “single- point- of- entry” 
model will facilitate the resolution of the larg-
est financial conglomerates. In 2014, Europe 
officially adopted its Single Resolution Mecha-
nism, which will be administered by the Euro-
pean Central Bank as part of its new supervi-
sory authority over the continent’s largest 
banks and will be funded via contributions 
from eligible banks, with national assessments 
assimilated into a communitywide fund over 
a number of years. The establishment of a Eu-
ropean resolution and funding mechanism 
will help break the link between a national gov-
ernment’s fiscal position and the health of do-
mestic financial institutions—a link that exac-
erbated Europe’s sovereign debt crisis. The 
crisis found many Eurozone countries unable 
to support troubled banks, either because the 
size of the bank exceeded national GDP or be-
cause public finances proved too unstable to 
provide any assistance.
National implementation of more effective 
resolution mechanisms has also been bol-
stered by the work of the FSB, which in 2011 
released a set of best practices it considers 
“necessary for an effective resolution regime.” 
The FSB is also developing a resolvability as-
sessment process that will be used to evaluate 
the feasibility and credibility of national reso-
lution mechanisms in the event of a globally 
systemic firm (G- SIFI) failure. Despite these 
significant regulatory advances, however, the 
orderly resolution of systemically important, 
highly complex cross- border firms will not be 
feasible without more global cooperation and 
a comprehensive transnational approach. For-
tunately, the G- 20 has recognized the impor-
tant relationship between structure and resolv-
ability. At the 2013 summit in St. Petersburg 
the G- 20 leadership instructed the FSB, the 
IMF, and the OECD (Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co- operation and Development) to col-
laborate in assessing “cross- border consisten-
cies and global financial stability implications 
1 2  f i n a nc i a l  r eforM
r sf :  t he  rus sel l  s age  f oundat ion  journa l  of  the  soc i a l  s c i ence s
[of structural reforms], taking into account 
country- specific circumstances.”
Overall, the substantive global rules devel-
oped and implemented in the post- crisis era 
are far more robust than their pre- crisis coun-
terparts and provide far fewer opportunities 
for regulatory arbitrage and evasion. Nonethe-
less, significant work remains, as does the un-
derlying question of whether the current inter-
national financial regulatory architecture is 
sufficient to the task of a truly sound global 
financial system. Achieving more organiza-
tional simplicity and clarity in the financial 
sector may also require new approaches alto-
gether. For example, the United States put in 
place a soft cap (10 percent of total financial 
liabilities) on the global liabilities of U.S. firms; 
once the cap is hit, these firms cannot merge 
with or acquire other financial institutions. A 
tax on the wholesale liabilities of financial 
firms would further reinforce safety in the sys-
tem by helping to constrain the size and com-
plexity of financial conglomerates; it would 
also help to offset the costs to society of poten-
tial future failures, forcing firms to internalize 
more of those costs. The Obama administra-
tion proposed such a tax, but it never gained 
traction in the United States. The IMF en-
dorsed the idea in 2010, but it has received lit-
tle attention since.
Even as the post- crisis intervention of the 
G- 20 in the global financial architecture has 
resulted in a harder, more formal system with 
a clearer hierarchy. More political accountabil-
ity, and a stronger framework for generating, 
implementing, and monitoring cross- border 
rulemaking variations across domestic regula-
tory regimes have proliferated, with the lead-
ing economies engaged in an ambitious trans-
national strategy of regulatory competition. 
Unlike in the pre- crisis era, however, national 
variation and international regulatory compe-
tition to date have not resulted in widespread 
races to the bottom and cross- border regula-
tory arbitrage. Instead, the post- crisis national 
regulatory strategies have largely resulted in 
upward deviations from an already more ro-
bust global regulatory floor—a global race to 
the top.
This new financial architecture means that 
national variation alone (defined earlier as the 
tailoring of global standards to individual do-
mestic landscape) can encourage this global 
race to the top. It also rewards first movers on 
a national basis, particularly as to the extrater-
ritorial application of domestic rules. One 
country can take the lead in developing more 
robust extraterritorial standards than those re-
quired on a global level, and by doing so can 
effectively push other countries into the adop-
tion of similarly stringent rules.
For instance, many countries are requiring 
firms to hold even more capital than the global 
minimum set by Basel III. In the United States, 
the supplemental leverage ratio for banks and 
thrifts is set at 6 percent, double the Basel III–
required leverage ratio, and at 5 percent at the 
bank–holding company level. Even Switzer-
land, a non- G- 20 nation and a traditional “off-
shore” banking center, has set tougher require-
ments than required under Basel III standards. 
For larger banks, Switzerland set higher capital 
requirements, up to 19 percent for the two larg-
est (UBS and Credit Suisse)—the so- called 
“Swiss Finish,” meaning a Swiss- specific addi-
tion to global standards.
In addition to regulatory variation across 
jurisdictions, some countries—including, 
most notably, the United States—have also ad-
opted aggressive extraterritorial strategies de-
signed to force reform upward on a global ba-
sis. For instance, the Federal Reserve Board of 
Governors has finalized new rules for foreign 
banking organizations (FBOs) operating in the 
United States. Under these rules, large FBOs 
are required to place non- branch assets under 
a U.S. intermediate holding company structure 
subject to consolidated supervision by the Fed-
eral Reserve. In many circumstances, FBOs will 
also now need to meet U.S. capital and liquid-
ity rules and prudential standards with respect 
to their U.S. operations, in addition to the rules 
they must meet under their home country’s 
laws.
These rules are prudent measures to reduce 
systemic risk and improve the safety and 
soundness of the U.S. financial system. Strong 
capital and liquidity rules will make these 
firms more robust against failure and less sub-
ject to debilitating runs in a crisis. Moreover, 
they help to make supervision and resolution 
of foreign firms operating in the United States 
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substantially more feasible, if such resolution 
is required. In many ways, the rules are consis-
tent with (or better than) the principle of na-
tional treatment, putting large FBOs and do-
mestic banking organizations on similar 
footing. Nevertheless, they have also engen-
dered significant controversy because of their 
extraterritorial reach, the potential to reduce 
the efficiency of the capital and liquidity allo-
cation of the consolidated firm globally, and 
the significant structural reforms they require 
from firms operating in the United States that 
are headquartered beyond U.S. borders. It re-
mains to be seen what effect the aggressive ap-
proach embodied in these new rules will have 
on the regulatory positions of foreign jurisdic-
tions; some fear retaliation, but in my judg-
ment, similar rulemaking by other jurisdic-
tions would advance the aim of more effective 
regulation on a cross- border basis and should, 
ideally, contribute to an evolving global race to 
the top.
A similar strategy has taken hold between 
the United States and European Union during 
the development of domestic cross- border de-
rivative regimes. The United States moved first, 
with strong reforms under the Dodd–Frank 
Act, followed by the release, by the Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), of a 
muscular proposed set of rules with significant 
extraterritorial reach. The rules drew signifi-
cant criticism from foreign banking organiza-
tions, international swap dealers, and the Eu-
ropean Commission, each of which understood 
the rules to effectively limit market partici-
pants who traded with U.S. parties to U.S. ex-
changes, in the absence of real reforms else-
where, thus triggering significant fears over 
market fragmentation. As the CFTC consid-
ered these concerns and negotiated with the 
European Commission, in 2013 it issued an ex-
emptive order delaying the effective date of the 
rules for several months. Not until the evening 
before this exemptive order lapsed were the 
CFTC and the European Commission able to 
agree on a “common path forward” (Barr 2014, 
1014–15).
This common- path agreement embraced 
“equivalence,” whereby the United States will 
consider European market participants and ex-
changes in compliance with both European 
and U.S. rules. Nevertheless, even as the CFTC’s 
strategy of extraterritoriality has resulted in 
stronger European rules and reduced the po-
tential for arbitrage, it has also increased trans-
atlantic tensions. Ideally, implementation of 
extraterritorial rules would involve closer regu-
latory coordination between domestic and for-
eign jurisdictions—particularly where, as here, 
there is a high degree of parallelism between 
the European Union and the United States. Al-
though the tensions between the United States 
and the European Union over cross- border de-
rivatives rules are not likely to scuttle coopera-
tion over other dimensions of the global- 
reform agenda, the possibility for transnational 
enmity and the need for cooperation will both 
grow as the global political commitment to re-
form wanes. The post- crisis experiences with 
national variation and extraterritorial strategy 
to date suggest that the G- 20 should avoid the 
adoption and implementation of rigid, de-
tailed rulemaking on a cross- border basis and 
should instead play the role of shepherd—
working through the FSB to produce rigorous, 
robust prudential standards; correcting down-
ward national deviations but otherwise en-
couraging strong domestic regimes that ex-
ceed minimum standards; and intervening 
where necessary to minimize transnational 
tensions.
fUTURe Risks
Despite the enormous progress to date, we can-
not afford to be complacent, and we need to 
keep pushing for reform. The next section fo-
cuses on five types of risk the financial system 
faces going forward—five ways it might fail 
next time. Of course, economists don’t know 
precisely how the risk in the system will evolve. 
It is important to be humble about our ability 
to understand new risks and predict financial 
crises. That is why the most important step 
economists and policymakers can take is to 
build a system that is more resilient to the un-
certain risks we face.
Amnesia
The first source of risk that could lead to an-
other financial crisis is a kind of amnesia: the 
danger that financial institutions, regulators, 
lawmakers, and the public will forget the les-
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sons of the financial crisis and let the system 
slip back into the practices that caused the last 
financial crisis. This amnesia is likely to occur 
as the crisis fades from memory and the finan-
cial system begins to feel safe again. No actor in 
the financial system is immune from such am-
nesia. Within financial institutions, risk manag-
ers, who are responsible for monitoring and 
managing a financial institution’s risk, can grow 
complacent during good times. In addition, 
managers and executives may push back against 
risk managers who raise concerns about risky 
but profitable practices and activities. In the 
lead- up to the last crisis, some risk managers 
who urged firms to exercise caution or recom-
mended that firms place limits on certain ac-
tivities and investments were demoted or fired.
Regulators are also susceptible to amnesia. 
Regulatory discretion is essential to effective 
financial regulation, but it also allows regula-
tors to soften their stance over time. We saw 
this before the last crisis. The public can also 
quickly forget the lessons of the financial crisis 
and the need for reform. Public attention to 
the financial system wanes as reporting on the 
financial system decreases and the fallout 
from the crisis fades from memory. Unfortu-
nately, when public attention wanes, lawmak-
ers and regulators may feel that the public will 
be less likely to hold them accountable in the 
event of a future crisis and as a result will feel 
less pressure to pass and implement meaning-
ful reforms (Coffee 2011). Frankly, the financial 
sector can and does seek to “buy” amnesia 
through lobbying and campaign contributions 
(Roe 1996). With public pressure off, the indus-
try can work behind the scenes—in Congress, 
in the federal rule- writing agencies, and in the 
courts—to roll back reforms and prevent any 
further restrictions (Coates 2015).
Although no actor in the financial system is 
immune from amnesia, we can take steps to 
ensure that institutions, regulators, and the 
public remain vigilant in good times. Within 
financial institutions we can continue to work 
to better align executive and managerial com-
pensation with the time horizons of risk. For 
example, regulators should require that SIFIs 
set up compensation systems such that the se-
nior executives of a firm would have their bo-
nuses clawed back in the event that the firm 
fails to meet certain capital levels or is subject 
to major fines or penalties.
We can include mechanisms within the reg-
ulatory architecture designed to reduce back-
sliding. Several such mechanisms were in-
cluded in the new regulatory infrastructure 
mandated by Dodd- Frank (see Barr 2015a). For 
example, the Financial Stability Oversight 
Council (FSOC) has the authority to recom-
mend stricter actions and to require regulators 
to implement them, or else to explain their fail-
ure to do so to Congress and the public. Dodd- 
Frank imposed a similar action- forcing disclo-
sure requirement on the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau. Twice a year the director of 
the CFPB is required to testify before and pro-
vide a report to Congress that includes not only 
a summary of the bureau’s activities but also 
a “discussion of the significant problems faced 
by consumers in shopping for or obtaining 
consumer financial products and services,” 
and an analysis of the complaints that the bu-
reau has received from consumers. Dodd- 
Frank charged entities with competing view-
points—the independent Office of Financial 
Research, the FSOC, and the Fed—to monitor 
and assess risks to the financial system.
Leverage and Liquidity
Concerning leverage, many ask whether the 
new capital levels are set high enough for the 
largest, most interconnected, and systemically 
important firms. The heightened capital re-
quirements on these firms, known as the SIFI 
surcharge, require firms to have much higher 
levels of “total loss absorbing capacity” to meet 
resolution requirements; however, it is not 
clear that equity levels are an adequate re-
sponse to the firms’ systemic risks. We must 
keep close watch on these firms and not be 
afraid to adjust the surcharge up as needed.
On liquidity, firms have greatly reduced 
their use of short- term debt, but much more 
needs to be done to address the risks posed by 
short- term funding. As a first step, we need to 
implement the Basel Committee’s approach to 
asset liquidity. In the United States, the Federal 
Reserve has implemented a SIFI surcharge that 
also takes into account liquidity risks, and 
such an approach should be adopted globally. 
Money market funds remain a source of risk 
 M a k ing  the  S y S t eM  S a f er  15
r sf :  t he  rus sel l  s age  f oundat ion  journa l  of  the  soc i a l  s c i ence s
in the system, even after the SEC’s reforms, 
and I believe stable net asset value funds 
should hold capital against these risks. FX (for-
eign exchange) markets need to move toward 
greater transparency, while margin and collat-
eral requirements should be improved.
Asset Bubbles
The formation of asset bubbles is a third 
source of risk that could lead to a future finan-
cial crisis, as it did to the last. Countercyclical 
prudential measures, especially countercycli-
cal capital standards, can help risks posed by 
asset bubbles. Countercyclical capital stan-
dards require financial institutions to hold 
more capital during boom times and less cap-
ital after downturns. It is also worth thinking 
about whether asset- specific countercyclical 
rules would help limit the formation of bub-
bles. For example, Switzerland requires finan-
cial institutions to hold more capital against 
mortgage- backed assets as home values in-
crease. Israel has adopted countercyclical 
mortgage lending regulations, including loan- 
to- value requirements. Going forward, we also 
need to make critical decisions about the fu-
ture of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the U.S. 
system of housing finance. We should focus on 
creating a housing finance system that has 
broad access to affordable and sustainable 
mortgage credit, protects taxpayers, and pro-
vides a realistic mechanism through which the 
government could stem a housing crisis.
Misunderstood Innovation
A fourth risk comes from misunderstood fi-
nancial innovations. Financial innovation 
drives economic growth by efficiently allocat-
ing capital. It lowers transaction costs, in-
creases liquidity, and helps disperse risk. It 
helps ensure that the needs of market partici-
pants are fully met. At the same time, however, 
financial innovation can hide risk. The finan-
cial sector sometimes creates complex finan-
cial products for the purpose of exploiting un-
informed consumers or investors. Financial 
innovations can also create risk when a prod-
uct that was developed to meet the needs of a 
small subset of the market is offered to a 
broader, less- sophisticated market. We saw 
that happen in the mortgage market when op-
tion ARMs or “pick a pay” mortgages, designed 
to meet uneven cash flow experienced by a 
small subset of the affluent self- employed, 
were sold to masses of borrowers who could 
ill- afford the risks such products posed.
Today, we see problems with exchange- 
traded funds (ETFs) and high- frequency trad-
ing. ETFs are popular with investors because 
they provide a low- cost, tax- efficient means of 
investing in a diversified fund. Recently, how-
ever, innovation in the ETF market has re-
sulted in increasingly complex and opaque 
funds that may pose risks to investors and to 
financial stability. This innovation includes the 
creation of synthetic, leveraged, and inverse 
ETFs, and runs the risks of contagions in ETF 
markets, when illiquidity in primary markets 
makes orderly investor redemptions in ETFs 
more difficult.
High- frequency trading uses computers and 
algorithms to make trades in less than a mil-
lisecond. Such high- speed trading has the 
 potential to improve market efficiency and li-
quidity. But it also raises serious concerns for 
financial stability—high- frequency trading 
contributed to the “flash crash” on May 6, 2010, 
when stock prices inexplicably and suddenly 
plunged, and may undermine the fairness of 
financial markets. Unfortunately, regulators 
have been behind the curve in understanding 
the way such trading functions and its poten-
tial risks.
Regulating in the face of financial innova-
tions is challenging. It is difficult to achieve the 
right balance between addressing the risks 
posed by innovation while maintaining its ben-
efits.
I believe the solution lies in developing flex-
ible forms of regulation that foster innovation 
while focusing on buffers in the system and 
regulatory checks and balances.
Global Risk
Last, we face the risk that global reform and 
recovery efforts will go off track. Sovereign risk 
remains real, a global mechanism to resolve 
ailing financial firms is still a goal rather than 
a reality, and the risk from lack of global coor-
dination is great. Yet we still are building a fi-
nancial architecture that relies on multiple ar-
chitects and plans.
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This volUme’s conTRibUTions
Scholars have developed varying approaches to 
assess financial reform since the crisis and no 
single journal issue could provide a compre-
hensive overview. This journal issue brings 
 together a series of articles focused on the 
Dodd- Frank Act as a whole, systemic risk and 
resolution authority, consumer and investor 
protection, market structure, and global re-
forms. The articles were developed for a con-
ference on the financial crisis hosted by the 
University of Michigan’s Center on Finance, 
Law, and Policy.
Martin Baily, Aaron Klein, and Justin Schar-
din have divided Dodd- Frank’s major reforms 
into five categories: areas that in their judg-
ment are clear wins, clear losses, costly trad-
eoffs, reforms that did not go far enough, and 
areas where it is too soon to tell. They argue 
that increased capital requirements, the new 
single- point- of- entry resolution mechanism, 
and the creation of the CFPB are clear wins, 
and the restrictions on the government’s crisis 
management tools in Dodd- Frank are a clear 
loss. They see the Volcker Rule and the Lincoln 
Amendment on derivatives trading as costly 
tradeoffs in the bill, and argue that the bill did 
not go far enough in consolidating the finan-
cial regulatory system. Empirical evidence will 
be required to test whether their initial judg-
ments are correct.
Howell Jackson argues that the single- point- 
of- entry framework for the resolution of sys-
temically important financial institutions, 
while it will help prevent the spread of losses 
through the financial system in a future crisis, 
nevertheless raises several concerns. First, the 
framework may increase moral hazard by ex-
panding the scope of government support. Sec-
ond, it may be more difficult than the FDIC 
anticipates for a holding company to send 
funding down to operating subsidiaries in a 
resolution. Third, there may be impediments 
to triggering losses of holding company credi-
tors. Jackson suggests specific reforms that can 
strengthen the ability to deal with a financial 
firm’s failure.
Lauren Willis argues for a new approach to 
consumer protection, moving away from mere 
disclosure to requiring firms to demonstrate 
that consumers comprehend the costs and 
benefits of a financial product or service before 
it is made available in the market. The Dodd- 
Frank Act directed the CFPB to promulgate 
rules designed to ensure that consumers un-
derstand the “costs, benefits, and risks” asso-
ciated with the financial products and services 
they purchase. Willis argues that although 
mandatory disclosures may increase compre-
hension in lab tests, consumers take shortcuts 
and firms run circles around the disclosures in 
practice. Willis advocates for the CFPB to 
adopt comprehensive performance standards 
instead of mandating disclosures. For exam-
ple, a bank imposing overdraft fees would have 
to prove to the CFPB, through third- party test-
ing, that customers know how overdraft fees 
work under various situations.
Jonathan Macey advocates for affording 
home mortgage borrowers the same protec-
tions as investors in the securities market. 
Macey argues that adopting basic protections 
from securities regulation would create inte-
gral protection for consumers in the home 
mortgage market. For example: (1) the duty of 
best execution, which would require mortgage 
brokers to give borrowers the best deal avail-
able to them at that time, (2) the suitability 
requirement, which would require mortgage 
brokers to have reasonable grounds to believe 
the mortgage is suitable for the borrower, and 
(3) the antichurning requirement, which would 
prevent brokers from encouraging borrowers 
to refinance to collect fees.
Michael Wellman argues that researchers 
must evaluate the effects of trading techniques 
in specific contexts to understand the effects 
of algorithmic and high- frequency trading on 
financial markets. He explains the model he 
created that combines an agent- based market 
simulation with a game theoretic analysis. The 
model shows the effects of high- frequency 
trading used for latency arbitrage, which in-
volves traders taking advantage of the time it 
takes information to travel from one market to 
another. The study found that high- frequency 
trading decreased overall market efficiency, 
even before accounting for the costs of creat-
ing the infrastructure necessary to make these 
trades. The model has also been used to show 
the effects of high- frequency trading in market 
making, where traders create a market for se-
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curities by maintaining offers to both buy and 
sell a security. Though high- frequency trading 
is usually thought to increase market liquidity, 
in many instances market efficiency decreased 
when liquidity was most needed.
A major post- crisis task for international fi-
nance and its regulators has been to develop 
better tools to measure systemic risk in the 
financial system. Viral Acharya suggests using 
a market measurement, SRISK, which uses a 
firm’s size, leverage, and risk profile to mea-
sure its vulnerability to a capital shortfall in a 
future crisis and the health of the financial 
system as a whole. The SRISK model suggests 
that the U.S. financial sector has grown 
steadily safer since the crisis. The European 
financial sector grew in risk, peaking during 
the sovereign debt crisis of 2011, and has 
grown somewhat safer since then. The Asian 
financial sector—Chinese financial institu-
tions in particular—has grown increasingly 
risky since the crisis. Acharya explains how the 
measure can improve regulator and market un-
derstanding of financial risk going forward.
Shedding light on one issue in global fi-
nance, Niamh Maloney argues that a funda-
mental shift has occurred in European financial 
regulation, and some fundamental new trends 
can be seen hidden in plain sight by the mud-
dling, iterative, and complex regional machina-
tions of Europe. Beneath the fractured and con-
tentious crisis- driven negotiations lie: a strong 
push toward centralization; more European- 
level regulation of both prudential and con-
sumer financial regulation; cross- border risk 
sharing by national governments; and harder 
law. The changes will have profound effects not 
only on the shape of financial regulation, but 
also on the continuously evolving tug between 
Euro- centrism and national prerogatives.
conclUsion
The financial system is safer, consumers and 
investors better protected, and taxpayers better 
insulated than they were before the crisis, but 
significant risks still remain. It will be critical 
to stay on the path of reform. The articles in 
this volume of the RSF Journal of the Social Sci-
ences provide new insights into several impor-
tant aspects of reform. As the volume editor I 
do not agree with every aspect of the analyses 
offered, and the same will be true for readers. 
But the articles provide engaging and essential 
reading for understanding the tradeoffs in-
volved in policymaking, and innovative ideas 
for making the financial system more resilient, 
market structure more efficient, finance fairer 
for consumers and investors, and global finan-
cial regulation better coordinated and effective.
There has been progress under the Dodd- 
Frank Act and global reforms in tackling many 
of these problems, but much more work needs 
to be done. Dodd- Frank and global rules have 
increased the amount of capital the largest 
firms have to hold, with a higher capital sur-
charge. In the United States there is now a cap 
on the relative size of the largest firms, such 
that mergers or acquisitions are blocked when 
a firm hits the cap. New liquidation procedures 
under Dodd- Frank require a firm’s managers, 
shareholders, and long- term debt holders to 
bear the losses of a firm’s failure, not taxpay-
ers. Living wills, structural reforms, and re-
quirements for total loss- absorbing capacity 
are making it more feasible to resolve failing 
major financial firms, but questions remain as 
to who will hold the long- term debt and how 
knock- on effects will be managed.
Building on these reforms, we need further 
effective steps to regulate the shadow banking 
world and curb the use of “hot money,” includ-
ing an explicit tax on liabilities that increases 
with the intensity of use of short- term whole-
sale funding, strong collateral and margin 
rules for securities financing transactions, and 
further money market fund reform to reduce 
the risk that we’ll experience another “bank” 
run or $3 trillion guarantee in that sector in 
the next crisis.
We must curb abusive high- frequency trad-
ing practices, bolster protections for exchange- 
traded funds, and make our markets more 
transparent and fair, by tackling conflicts of 
interest that too often leave regular investors 
exposed to unnecessary risks and fees.
We ought to require accountability at the 
top. Senior managers should suffer decreases 
of their compensation when their firms fail to 
meet capital standards or are hit with fines or 
penalties. The SEC must use its new authorities 
to fine credit- rating agencies that bend their 
analyses to meet the desires of Wall Street firms.
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The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
must be strengthened and supported, not at-
tacked at every turn. One key step is barring 
the kind of arbitration clauses in consumer fi-
nance contracts that prevent consumers from 
banding together to get their day in court (Barr 
2015b). Financial innovation needs to focus on 
new ways to help families cope with their vola-
tile income and expenses, and make it easier 
and less expensive to build a financial cushion. 
We also need to stop abusive small business 
lending practices and instead expand access to 
capital, skills, and business opportunities. 
(Barr 2015c).
The financial system is much safer and a 
good bit fairer than it was prior to the financial 
crisis, but that is not enough. We must keep 
fighting for a financial system that works for 
all of us.
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